

## Royceanizing Peirce's Normative Sciences

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**Problem:** Peirce claims that the sciences are organized such that the prior sciences lend principles to the posterior sciences. In Peirce's classification of the normative sciences, ethics precedes logic. Why, then, does logic depend on principles from ethics, and what are those principles?

### Proposed Answers:

(1) Logic depends on ethics because logic is a kind of conduct. But then logic should be a sub-discipline of logic, which in Peirce's classification it is not.

(2) Logic depends on ethics because there is a parallelism between moral and rational conduct. But then prior to logic and ethics should be a moral general science that explicates what is common to them, much as general metaphysics precedes physical and psychical metaphysics. Peirce, though, proposes no such science.

(3) There is not an order of dependency among the normative sciences. But this is contrary to Peirce own statements.

**My Proposal:** In Royce's 1914 Berkeley Conferences, Royce shows how Peirce's three logical sentiments, which in Peirce's judgment are indispensable requirements of logic but with respect to which reasoning is a "trifling impertinence," emerge in the ethical life.

### Quotations:

(1) "the methods of inductive science and the practical attitude of the loyalist have an intimate and close connection which we need to understand somewhat better than we do" (BC 24)

(2) There is "a very close connection between the ethical attitude of the scientific inquirer and the characteristic attitude of the loyal man. Both the loyalist and the scientific man combine an interest in the unity of the social order with a respect for individual freedom of inquiry" (BC 23).

(3) "the effort to make my inferences probable becomes an important effort only when, not my private interests, but those of a community are concerned" (BC 28).

(4) "Such a man would be like who was asked whether he was willing to take a risk that was greater than all the gains he could possibly hope to make at any future time in case just that risk happened to go against him. ...if I am willing to take so small a risk of losing everything, my soul included, that willingness is due simply to my own boldness, or to my own indifference to the fact that may happen to me. There is no reason why I should take the risk even if it is represented by a small fraction of what is called probability" (BC 28-29).

(5) "It is the will of the scientific community...that these definable methods...should be followed. When the community, the scientific community gets its will expressed, nobody can guarantee to the individual scientific worker who makes this inference on the occasion that his inference will be correct" (BC 30).

(6) "A method of using experience has been found which any individual investigator can within his own limits apply and which becomes especially significant because a great many people can apply it together. This method is applied in the course of the history of science, and, as we may reasonably suppose, will be applied in an indefinitely long future, by what we may call the scientific community, that is, the whole body of workers who make use of such methods in dealing with nature. The nature of such methods in question is such that...there must be such an increasing proportion of correct inferences if the natural world which we study has...any definite characters whatever, any definable constitution, any order in it" (BC 36).